Recent U.S. evidence suggests that the response of labor share to a productivity shock is characterized by countercyclicality and overshooting. These …ndings cannot be easily reconciled with existing business cycle models. We extend the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of search in the labor market by considering strategic interactions among an endogenous number of producers, which leads to countercyclical price markups. While Nash bargaining delivers a countercyclical labor share, we show that countercyclical markups are fundamental to address the overshooting. On the contrary, we …nd that real wage rigidity does not seem to play a crucial role for the dynamics of the labor share of income.
1 Introduction Figure 1 , shows the dynamics of the labor share, the average product of labor and the real wage to a one standard deviation orthogonalized productivity innovation for the U.S. in the period 1954. I-2004 .IV, as reported by Rios-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010) . The response of the labor share is characterized by countercyclicality and overshooting. In response to the shock the labor share falls on impact, and then shows an hump-shaped response, overshooting its long-run level after …ve quarters, and peaking at the …fth year at a level larger in absolute terms than the initial drop. Seven years after the peak the labor share is still half-way toward its steady state value.
To account for the response of the labor share to a technology shock displayed in the …gure a model should satisfy two desiderata. The …rst one is that the impact increase in the real wage must be lower than that of average labor productivity. The second one is the presence of a persistent wedge between average labor productivity and real wages, such that the response of the latter is smoother and more inertial with respect to that of the former. The …rst property implies a countercyclical labor share, while the second one is necessary for overshooting. Figure 1 : Empirical IRFs of wages, average product of labor, and labor share to productivity innovations in the U.S. Percentage deviations from long run averages. Source: Rios-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010) .
In this paper we build on Colciago and Rossi (2011) to develop a theory of the joint dynamics of the labor share and technology shocks which satis…es both desiderata and replicates the countercyclicality and the overshooting of the labor share.
As argued by Rios-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010), standard business cycle models cannot explain these empirical regularities. The RBC model implies that the real wage and labor productivity move identically, so that the labor share of income displays no cyclical dynamics. The conventional Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model (DMP model, henceforth) of search in the labor market with Nash bargaining explains the countercyclicality of the labor share in response to a productivity shock, but cannot address the overshooting. 2 While the overshooting of the labor share is still unexplained, targeting the dynamics of the labor share in DSGE estimated models can help the identi…cation of relevant parameters.
We outline a DMP model with Nash Bargaining and Endogenous Market Structures. Market structures are said to be endogenous since both the number of producers and price markups are determined in each period. The model features …rms'entry à la Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012) (BGM 2012, henceforth) and oligopolistic competition between producers as in Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) and Colciago and Etro (2010) . Nash bargaining allows to replicate the countercyclicality of the labor share, while the key ingredient to replicate the overshooting result is the countercyclicality of price markups originating from strategic interactions between an endogenous number of producers. To build intuition, consider the e¤ect of a technology shock. The latter creates profits opportunities which attract …rms into the market. This strengthens competition and, via strategic interactions, reduces persistently the price markup. A persistently lower markup acts as a shifter of the standard marginal product of labor and creates a wedge between average labor productivity and the real wage. Speci…cally, a lower markup pushes the real wage schedule above the average productivity of labor for several periods. Besides being consistent with the dynamics displayed in Figure  1 , this leads to the overshooting of the labor share.
Aggregate real wages are characterized by an high degree of persistence. Hall (2005) , inter alia, points out that real wage rigidity is a feature needed to account for a number of labor market facts. For this reason we study the e¤ect of real wage rigidity on the dynamics of the labor share. Introducing real wage rigidity in the DMP framework with constant markups is not su¢ cient to match the empirical evidence on the dynamics of the labor share in response to a technology shock. We …nd that augmenting our framework with (a limited degree of) real wage rigidity does not alter the previous …ndings, and allows a better matching of the amplitude of the labor share overshooting observed in the data.
To the best of our knowledge we are the …rst to present a model addressing the overshooting of the labor share through countercyclical markups. Hornstein (1993) augments the neoclassical growth model with increasing return to scale, a …xed number of …rms and constant markups. He …nds a labor share that is half as volatile as what is observed in the data, but does not address the overshooting. Also, the role of real wage rigidities for the dynamics of the labor share had not been explored yet.
Choi and Rios-Rull (2010) obtain the overshooting considering a model with putty-clay technology, decentralized non-competitive wage setting (bilateral Nash bargaining) and an aggregate technological shock that has a stronger e¤ect for newer hires. The technology process that we adopt is, instead, fully standard. Shao and Silos (2011) also consider an economy with costly entry of …rms and a frictional labor market. However, their model is characterized by monopolistic competition between small …rms and by constant price markups. In their framework the overshooting is due to the countercyclical value of vacancies. Nevertheless, this condition is di¢ cult to test empirically. On the contrary, our transmission mechanism is well supported by the empirical evidence. Bils (1987), Rotemberg and Woodford (2000) and Galì et al. (2007) forcefully document price markup countercyclicality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a decomposition of the labor share of income. Section 3 outlines the model economy. Section 4 is devoted to calibration. Section 5 contains the main results. Section 6 concludes. Technical details are left in the Appendix.
The labor share and its components
Independently of the speci…cation of the model considered, the labor share is de…ned as ls t = wtHt Yt = w t A t , where H t are total hours worked and A t = Yt Ht is the average productivity of labor. In log-deviations
where a hat over a variable denotes the log-deviation from the steady state. Equation (1) simply states that the log-deviation of the labor share is the di¤erence between the log-deviation of the real wage and that of the average labor productivity. In the standard RBC model the real wage equals the marginal product of labor. In log-deviation this amounts toŵ
As a result the labor share is constant and does not deviate from its steady state, that is b ls t = 0: Equations (1) and (2) suggest that in order to obtain a non constant labor share the allocative role of the real wage has to be broken.
In the search and matching framework this is obtained through Nash bargaining. The latter implies that workers and …rms split the total surplus originating from a match. The equilibrium real wage maximizes the joint surplus of the parties and depends on their relative bargaining power. Thus, in the aftermath of a productivity increase just a fraction of the latter is distributed to workers. Di¤erently from the standard RBC model, this implies that the real wage rises by less than the increment in labor productivity. Hence, Nash Bargaining helps explaining the countercyclicality of the labor share.
However, in the reminder we show that in the standard DMP framework with Nash bargaining the real wage remains always below average labor productivity along the cycle. This goes against the evidence reported in Figure 1 and, importantly, prevents the standard DMP model from addressing the overshooting of the labor share.
In order to reproduce the overshooting, the real wage should display a smoother and more inertial dynamics than labor productivity. The countercyclical and inertial dynamics of price markup which characterizes our approach delivers this mechanism.
3 The model
Labor and Goods Markets
There are two main building blocks in the model: oligopolistic competition with endogenous entry in the goods market and search and matching frictions in the labor market. In this paragraph we outlay their main features.
As in Colciago and Etro (2010) the economy features a continuum of sectors, or industries, on the unit interval. Sectors are indexed with j 2 (0; 1) : Each sector j is characterized by di¤erent …rms i = 1; 2; :::; N jt producing the same good in di¤erent varieties. At the beginning of each period N e jt new …rms enter into sector j, while at the end of the period a fraction 2 (0; 1) of market participants exits from the market for exogenous reasons.
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions, as in Andolfatto (1996) and Mertz (1995) . A fraction u t of the unit mass population is unemployed at time t and searches for a job. Firms producing at time t need to post vacancies in order to hire new workers. Unemployed workers and vacancies combine according to a CRS matching function and deliver m t new hires, or matches, in each period. The matching function reads as m t = m (v tot t ) 1 u t , where m re ‡ects the e¢ ciency of the matching process, v tot t is the total number of vacancies created at time t and u t is the unemployment rate. The probability that a …rm …lls a vacancy is given by q t = mt v tot t , while the probability to …nd a job for an unemployed worker reads as z t = mt ut . Firms and individuals take both probabilities as given. Matches become productive in the same period in which they are formed. Each …rm separates exogenously from a fraction 1 % of existing workers each period, where % is the probability that a worker stays with a …rm until the next period.
As a result a worker may separate from a job for two reasons: either because the …rm where the job is located exits from the market or because the match is destroyed. Since these sources of separation are independent, the evolution of aggregate employment, L t , is given by L t = (1 ) %L t 1 + m t : Thus, the number of unemployed workers searching for a job at time t is u t = 1 L t 1 .
Households and Firms
Using the family construct of Mertz (1995) we can refer to a representative household consisting of a continuum of individuals of mass one. Members of the household insure each other against the risk of being unemployed. The representative family has lifetime utility:
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and the variable h t represents individual hours worked. Note that C jt is a consumption index for a set of goods produced in sectors j 2 [0; 1], de…ned as
where C jt (i) is the production of …rm i of this sector, and " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in each sector. 3 The distinction between di¤erent sectors and di¤erent goods within a sector allows to realistically separate limited substitutability at the aggregated level, and high substitutability at the disaggregated level. The 3 The term N 1 1 " jt in (4) implies that there is no variety e¤ect in the model. However, allowing for a variety e¤ect would not change our results. 6 family receives real labor income w t h t L t and pro…ts from the ownership of …rms. Further, we assume that unemployed individuals receive an unemployment bene…t b in real terms, leading to an overall bene…t for the household equal to b (1 L t ). This is …nanced through lump sum taxation by the government. Notice that the household recognizes that employment is determined by the ‡ows of its members into and out of employment according to
Households choose how much to save in riskless bonds and in the creation of new …rms through the stock market according to standard Euler and asset pricing equations. 4 Each …rm i in sector j produces a good with a linear production function. We abstract from capital accumulation issues and assume that labor is the only input. Output of …rm i in sector j is then:
where A t is the, common to all sectors, total factor productivity at time t, n jt (i) is …rm i's time t workforce and h jt (i) represent hours per employee. Since each sector can be characterized in the same way, in what follows we will drop the index j and refer to the representative sector.
Endogenous Market Structures
Following BGM (2012) we assume that new entrants at time t will only start producing at time t+1. Given the exogenous exit probability , the average number of …rms per sector, N t , follows the equation of motion:
where N e t is the average number of new entrants at time t. In each period, the same nominal expenditure for each sector EXP t is allocated across the available goods according to the direct demand function:
where P t is the price index
4 These conditions are in the Appendix. 7 such that total expenditure, EXP t , satis…es
Inverting the direct demand functions, we can derive the system of inverse demand functions
which will be useful for the derivation of the Cournot equilibrium. Period t real pro…ts of an incumbent producer are de…ned as
where w t (i) is the real wage paid by …rm i, v t (i) represents the number of vacancies posted at time t and is the output cost of keeping a vacancy open. The value of a …rm is the expected discounted value of its future pro…ts
where t;t+1 = (1 ) C t+1 Ct 1 is the households'stochastic discount factor which takes into account that …rms' survival probability is 1
. Incumbent …rms which do not exit from the market have a time t individual workforce given by
Under di¤erent forms of competition between …rms we obtain prices satisfying:
where ( ; N t ) > 1 is the markup depending on the degree of substitutability between goods, ", and on the number of …rms, N t , and mc t (i) is the real marginal cost. In the remainder of this section we characterize this mark up under Bertrand and Cournot competition taking strategic interactions into account.
Bertrand Competition
Each …rm chooses p t (i) ; n t (i) and v t (i) to maximize t (i)+V t (i), taking as given the price of the other …rms in the sector. The problem is subject to two constraints, namely equation (8) and (13). 6 The symmetric Bertrand equilibrium generates an equilibrium markup
The markup P t is decreasing in the degree of substitutability between products ", with an elasticity P " = "N t =(1 "+"N t )(" 1). Moreover, the markup vanishes in case of perfect substitutability: lim "!1 P ( ; N t ) = 1. Finally, the markup is decreasing in the number of …rms, with an elasticity P N = N= [1 + "(N 1)] (N 1). Notice that the elasticity of the markup to entry under competition in prices is decreasing in the level of substitutability between goods, and it tends to zero when the goods are approximately homogenous. When N t ! 1 the markup tends to "=(" 1), the traditional one under monopolistic competition. As well known, strategic interactions between a …nite number of …rms lead to a higher markup than under monopolistic competition.
Cournot Competition
In this case …rms maximize t (i) + V t (i) choosing their production y t (i) beside n t (i) and v t (i) ; taking as given the production of the other …rms. The pro…t maximization problem is constrained by the inverse demand function (10) and by equation (13). The symmetric Cournot equilibrium generates a equilibrium markup
First of all notice that for a given number of …rms, the markup under competition in quantities is always larger than the one obtained under competition in prices. 7 Further, also in this case the markup is decreasing in the degree of substitutability between products ", with an elasticity Q " = 1=(" 1), which is always smaller than P " : higher substitutability reduces markups faster under competition in prices. In the Cournot equilibrium, the markup remains positive for any degree of substitutability, since even in the case of homogenous goods, we have lim "!1 Q ("; N t ) = N t =(N t 1). The markup Q ("; N t ) is decreasing and convex in the number of …rms with elasticity Q N = 1=(N 1), which is decreasing in N t (the markup decreases with entry at an increasing rate) and independent from the degree of substitutability between goods. Since Q N > P N for any number of …rms or degree of substitutability, entry decreases markups faster under competition in quantities compared to competition in prices, a result that will impact on the relative behavior of the economy under the two forms of competition. Only when N t ! 1 the markup tends to "=(" 1), which is the traditional markup under monopolistic competition.
Entry and Job creation
We assume that entry requires a …xed cost , which is measured in units of output. De…ne V e t as the value at time t of a prospective entrant. Given our timing assumption, the latter represents the value of a …rm which will start producing at time t+1. In each period the level of entry is determined endogenously to equate the value of a prospective entrant to the entry cost
Pro…ts maximization implies the following Job Creation Condition (JCC)
The JCC equates the real marginal cost of hiring a worker, the left hand side, with the marginal bene…t, the right hand side. Importantly, the marginal bene…t depends positively on the ratio 1 J t (with J equal either to P or to Q), which is a positive function of the number of …rms in the market, N t . Stronger competition leads to a lower mark up which stimulates demand by consumers and hence has a positive e¤ect on output and ultimately on employment.
As shown by Colciago and Rossi (2011) , a positive technology shock leads to entry of new …rms and thus to an increase in 1 J t . In equilibrium, since hiring depends on the current and expected future values of the marginal product of labor, this boosts hiring and employment with respect to a model with constant markups.
The JCC is common across …rms, independently of their period of entry. Thus, the optimal hiring policy of new producers, i.e. …rms which at time t are producing for the …rst time and have no initial workforce, consists in posting as many vacancies as required to reach the size of …rms which started production in earlier periods. This has two implications. The …rst one is that the size-gap between new producers and incumbent …rms is closed in a single period. The second one is that new producers grow faster than more mature …rms. This is consistent with the U.S. empirical evidence discussed in Haltiwanger et al. (2010) , which suggests that a start-up creates on average more new jobs than an incumbent …rm. Given vacancy posting is costly, new producers will su¤er lower pro…ts and pay lower dividends in their …rst period of activity with respect to …rms which entered into the market in earlier periods. This is consistent with the evidence on the …nancial behavior of …rms discussed by Cooley and Quadrini (2001) .
Bargaining over Wages and Hours
In the Appendix it is shown that Nash wage bargaining results in the following wage equation
ut is the tightness of the job market and the parameter re ‡ects the relative bargaining power of workers. The wage shares costs and bene…ts associated to the match. The worker is rewarded for a fraction of the …rm's revenues and savings of hiring costs and compensated for a fraction 1 of the disutility he su¤ers from supplying labor and the foregone unemployment bene…ts. The direct e¤ect of competition on the real wage is captured through the term 1 j t A t , which represents the share of the marginal revenue product (MRP) which goes to workers. As discussed above, entry leads to an increase in the ratio 1 j t and hence in the MRP. Thus, everything else equal, stronger competition shifts the wage curve up. This result is similar to that in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , who …nd a positive e¤ect of competition on the real wage. Hours are set to maximize the joint surplus of the match. This is obtained when the marginal rate of substitution between hours and consumption equals the MRP of labor, that is
Stronger competition leads to an increase in hours bargained between workers and …rms for the same reasons for which competition positively a¤ects the wage schedule.
Aggregation and Market Clearing
Considering that the individual workforce, n t , is identical across producers leads to
To obtain aggregate output notice that P
further given pt Pt = 1 and the individual production function it follows that
where H t is the amount of total hours worked. As a consequence A t amounts to average labor productivity, which is assumed to follow a …rst order autoregressive process given by ln (A t =A) = A ln (A t 1 =A) + " At , where A 2 (0; 1) and " At is a white noise disturbance, with zero expected value and standard deviation A . Aggregating the budget constraints of households we obtain the aggregate resource constraint of the economy
which states that the sum of consumption and investment in new entrants must equal the sum between labor income and aggregate pro…ts, t , distributed to households at time t. Goods'market clearing requires
where v tot t is the sum of vacancies posted by new entrants and by …rms which entered in earlier periods. Finally, the dynamics of aggregate employment reads as
which shows that workers employed to a …rm which exits the market join the mass of unemployed.
Calibration
To solve the model described in the previous section the equations are linearized around the model's steady state. 8 Calibration is as follows. The discount factor, , is set to 0.99. As in BGM (2012) the rate of business destruction, , equals 0.025. This means roughly 10 percent of …rms disappear from the market every year, independently of …rm age. The entry cost is = 1 and held constant along the cycle. With no loss of generality, the value of is such that steady state labor supply equals one. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is ' = 1. The intersectoral elasticity of substitution is " = 6, as estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) . As standard in the literature we set the steady state marginal productivity of labor, A, to 1. As Rios-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010) we consider a one standard deviation technology innovation, that corresponds to a one percent increase in the labor productivity, and we set a = 0:925. We set the separation rate % equal to 0:1, as suggested by estimates provided by Hall (1995) and Davis et al. (1996) . The elasticity of matches to unemployment, ; is set equal to the worker bargaining power and is equal to 1 2 ; as in the bulk of the literature. The e¢ ciency parameter in matching, m , and the steady state job market tightness are calibrated to target an average job …nding rate, z, equal to 0.7 and a vacancy …lling rate, q, equal to 0.9. We draw the latter value from Andolfatto (1996) and Dee Haan et al. (2000) , while the former from Blanchard and Galì (2010) . 9 Finally, we calibrate the unemployment bene…t in real terms, b, such that the monetary replacement rate, b wh , equals 0:60. This value is consistent with that reported in the OECD Economic Outlook of 1996 for the US. Given these parameters we can recover the cost of posting a vacancy by equating the steady state version of the JCC and the steady state wage setting equation. Notice that none of the qualitative result is a¤ected by the calibration strategy.
Productivity Shocks and Dynamics of the Labor share
In what follows we study the impulse response functions of the labor share and its components to a one percent increase in technology. To isolate the role of endogenous markup variability for the dynamics of the labor share we compare the performance of the models with Bertrand and Cournot competition to that of a model characterized by monopolistic competition. Under monopolistic competition …rms do not interact strategically and set a constant markup over marginal costs equal to = " " 1 . Figure 2 shows that, on impact, the real wage increase less than average labor productivity no matter the form of competition in the goods market. As argued above, Nash bargaining delivers the countercyclicality of the labor share of income. Under monopolistic competition, after peaking on impact, the real wage returns monotonically to its initial level. Further, it remains below labor productivity in all periods so that the labor share does not overshoot. This is not the case when the goods market is characterized by oligopolistic competition. Under both Bertrand and Cournot, the la- bor share is countercyclical due to Nash Bargaining. However the labor share overshoots its long run level after about …ve quarters, it peaks at about the …fth year at a level larger than its long-run value and seven years after the shock has hit the economy is still halfway toward its average. The key lies in the countercyclical and inertial response of the price markup. To see this, consider the log-deviations of the real wage and labor hours from their steady state. These are respectivelŷ
. Under all plausible parametrization, we …nd that 1 is lower than one. As a result, only a fraction 1 < 1 of the impact increase in productivityÂ t goes to workers. Further, equation (26) shows that labor hours increase with productivity and contribute to dampen the positive e¤ect of productivity on real wages. Hence, the impact increase in real wages is lower than that of labor productivity and the labor share is countercyclical. In a model with endogenous market structures these are just partial e¤ects. Technology shocks create expectations of future pro…ts which lead to the entry of new …rms. Stronger competition leads to lower price markups. Given that entry is subject to a one period timeto-build lag, the total number of …rms, N t , does not change on impact, but builds up gradually. As shown in Figure 2 , in the Cournot and in the Bertrand model this translates into an initially muted response of the markup. As entry increases the number of …rms, however, the price markup starts declining. In particular it …nds its negative peak after few periods and then gradually reverts to its long run value. 10 Equation (25) shows that a persistently lower markup acts as a shifter of the standard marginal product of labor schedule pushing the real wage above the average productivity of labor for several periods. Since b ls t =ŵ t Â t ; this explains the overshooting of the labor share. Thus, we can state that the dynamic response of the markup to technology shocks is fundamental for the overshooting. 11 In the Cournot model the initial drop of the labor share as well as the timing and amplitude of the overshooting are very close to their data counterpart (see Figure 1) . In the Bertrand model, the magnitude of the overshooting is lower than in the data. The reason is the stronger markup variation under Cournot, which is re ‡ected in a larger wedge between the real wage and average labor productivity.
The role of real wage rigidity
Aggregate wages are characterized by an high degree of persistence, so that sudden and large shifts in the aggregate wage level are not observed. The existence of real wage rigidities has been pointed to by many authors as a feature needed to account for a number of labor market facts (see, e.g., Hall 2005) .
Real wage rigidity leads to a slow adjustment of wages to labor market conditions. In particular, in response to a productivity shock it leads to a smoother and more inertial dynamics of the real wage than the average labor productivity. As emphasized above, this is the key feature a model should satisfy to address the overshooting of the labor share in response to a technology shock. For this reason we study the e¤ect of real wage rigidity on the dynamics of the labor share. Following Hall (2005) , we model real wage rigidity in the form of a backward looking 
where w is an index re ‡ecting the degree of real wage rigidity and w nash t is the wage obtained under Nash Bargaining, i.e. that in equation (18). Notice that w = 1 implies a …xed real wage, while w = 0 corresponds to the case of Nash bargaining analyzed earlier. As observed by Blanchard and Galì (2007) , equation (27), even though admittedly ad-hoc, is a parsimonious way of introducing a slow adjustment of real wages to labor market conditions. 13 Figure 3 displays the response of the labor share to a one percent increase in technology in the Bertrand and the Cournot models as well as in the model with monopolistic competition. Since there is no evidence on the degree of real wage rigidities, we consider two alternative values of the parameter w . Dashed lines refer to the case w = 0:5, the midpoint of the admissible range. Solid lines depict the extreme case where w = 0:9. 14 In the model with constant price markups the labor share overshoots its long run level just in the case of extreme real wage rigidity. Nevertheless the overshooting is negligible. This con…rms that countercyclical price markups are key for the overshooting of the labor share.
Augmenting the Cournot and Bertrand competitive frameworks with a limited degree of real wage rigidity, does not alter the previous …ndings substantially, nevertheless it improves the matching of the amplitude of the overshooting from a quantitative point of view. Our view is that real wage rigidity does not seem to play a crucial role for the dynamics of the labor share of income.
Conclusion
Recent U.S. evidence suggests that the response of labor share to a productivity shock is characterized by countercyclicality and overshooting. To account for these empirical …ndings a model should satisfy two desiderata. The …rst one is that the impact increase in the real wage must be lower than that of average labor productivity. The second one is the presence of a persistent wedge between average labor productivity and real wages such that the response of the latter is smoother and more inertial with respect to that of the former.
We propose a DMP model characterized by …rms'entry and oligopolistic competition between producers that addresses this evidence. Nash bargaining delivers the countercyclicality of the labor share. The countercyclicality of price markup originating from strategic interactions in the goods market acts as a shifter of the standard marginal product of labor and allows the labor share of income to overshoot.
While real wage rigidity helps accounting for a number of labor market facts, such as the variability of unemployment in response to a technology shock and the slow response of real wages to labor market conditions, it does not seem to play a crucial role for the dynamics of the labor share of income. activity new producers are indistinguishable from …rms that entered in t-2 or earlier.
Households
We assume that households invest in both incumbent …rms and new entrants. Bonds and stocks are denominated in terms of the …nal good. The budget constraint expressed in nominal terms is
where B t is net bond holdings with interest rate r t , V jt is the value of an incumbent …rm in sector j and V e jt is the value of a new entrant in the same sector. The variables N jt and N e jt represent the number of active …rms in sector j and the new entrants in this sector at the end of the period, respectively. The variable s jt represents the share of the portfolio of incumbent …rms belonging to sector j that is owned by the household, while s e jt is the share of portfolio of new entrants held by the household. The term (1 ) P t R 1 0 [ jt ("; N jt ) + V jt ] N jt 1 s jt represents the sum between the value of the portfolio of …rms which entered the market in period t-2 or earlier held by the household and the pro…ts distributed by these …rms.
Notice the number of these …rms is equal to (1 ) N jt 1 in each sector. The term (1 ) P t R 1 0 new jt ("; N jt ) + V jt N e jt 1 s e jt denotes the sum between the value of the portfolio of new producers, where (1 ) N e jt 1 is the number of …rms which produce for the …rst time at time t. In the budget constraint we have imposed the symmetry in the value of new …rms and incumbent …rms. Finally P t T t represent nominal lump sum taxes imposed to …nance unemployment bene…ts. The household recognizes that employment is determined by the ‡ows of its members into and out of employment according to
Equations (28) and (29) represent the constraint to the utility maximization problem. We denote with t the Lagrangian multiplier of the …rst constraint, while t is the one of the second constraint.
The intertemporal optimality conditions with respect to s jt+1 , s e jt+1 for each sector, and with respect to B t+1 are, respectively 18
The optimal choice of consumption requires
Notice that t has the meaning of the marginal value to the household of having a member employed rather than unemployed. The latter a¤ects bargaining over the real wage and individual hours and it is given by
where w t = Wt Pt is the real wage.
Pro…t Maximization Problem
Consider Bertrand competition. We initially consider the problem of an incumbent …rm. Substituting the direct demand for the individual good into period t real pro…ts, we obtain
The pro…t maximization problem of an incumbent …rm reads as max fpt(i);nt(i);vt(i)g 1
and n t (i) = n t 1 (i) +v t (i) q t (38)
and @L @p t (i) = 0 :
(1 ")
Notice that we assume that …rms take individual wages as given when choosing employment. Also notice that since there is a continuum of sectors, the individual …rm takes the aggregate price level as given. The second condition shows that t (i), the surplus created by a match, is identical across incumbent …rms. Before providing an explicit formula for the individual price level and the price markup, we turn to the pro…t maximization problem of a …rst period producer which sets the price for the …rst time. The relevant di¤erence with respect to the previous case is represented by the form of constraint (38) which reads as v t (i) q t = n t (i), since producers in their …rst period of activity have no initial workforce. However, FOCs with respect to are active at time t, no matter the period of entry, choose the same price. Since …rms face the same demand function and adopt the same technology, it follows that y t (i) = y t and n t (i) = n t : We are now ready to provide an expression for the common price chosen by …rms. Given that …rms choose the same price level, it follows that p (i) = p t = P t . Imposing symmetry and rearranging, condition (14) can be rewritten as
where t = " (N t 1) + 1 (" 1) (N t 1)
Further, notice that, after imposing symmetry, by combining equation (39) and (40) we get the JCC reported in the main text. Under Cournot competition pro…t maximization must take the inverse demand function as a constraint. The latter is
EXP t which implies that period pro…ts can be written as t = y t (i) 1 1 " Nt X j=1 y t (j)
" 1 " EXP t P t w t (i) n t (i) h t (i) kv t (i)
Setting up a Lagrangian function as in the proof of Proposition 1 and differencing with respect to y t (i); n t (i) ; v t (i), it can be easily veri…ed that the FOCs with respect to n t (i) ; v t (i) are unchanged with respect to the Bertrand case.
Wage setting
The real wage and hours worked are set to maximize the product
where the term in the …rst bracket, t ; is the value to the …rm of having an additional worker, i.e., the second term, t ; is the household's surplus expressed in units of consump-
The FOC with respect to the wage is
Notice that d t dwt C t = d t dwt = h t , thus (48) can be simpli…ed as follows
Multiply both sides of equation (49) 
leading one period and taking expectations as of time t leads to %E t t;t+1 t+1 = (1 ) % (1 ) C t E t t+1 ;
substituting for t and t C t and simplifying
Multiplying both sides of (49) by z t C t 1 Ct , leading one period and taking expectation as of time t, we can rewrite
using the latter it follows that
(1 ) C t E t z t+1 t+1 = E t C t C t+1 z t+1 t+1 = (1 ) t;t+1 z t+1 t+1 ;
substituting into (52) delivers t t A t h t = w t h t (1 ) h 1+1=' t C t 1 + 1=' + (1 ) b+ (1 ) t;t+1 z t+1 t+1 ;
…nally, using t = qt and zt qt = t ; and rearranging, we get
which is the wage equation in the text. Similarly, the FOC for hours Nash bargaining is
Considering that
(57) can be written as
Finally, using equation (49), equation (58) simpli…es to
which is the equation for hours worked in the text.
